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Land issues are at the heart of the Congolese conflicts (Huggins 2010; Vlassenroot 2004; Mathieu et al. 1999; Mararo 1997). 
Land issues have mainly been analyzed as a rural phenomenon. More recently, however, scholars have shown that land 
issues are crucially important in urban areas as well (Büscher 2012; Wagemakers et al. 2009; Büscher 2018; Büscher and 
Vlassenroot 2010; Peyton 2018).
Land is a key resource and its attribution is of vital economic and political concern across societal groups. Crucially, therefore, 
the control of land is a key determinant of power in the Congo. Land is not only important as a material resource; it is also 
woven into many aspects of social life for Congo’s urban residents. Occupation and possession of land are important sources 
of prestige and self-esteem, and it contributes in no small way to determining people’s social, economic, and political 
positions in society (Büscher 2012). 
Hence, land issues relate to questions of property more broadly, and as such implicates social, economic, and political 
power relations in the widest sense (Lund and Boone 2013, 1).
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	 In	 this	 policy	 brief	 we	 analyze	 the	 nexus	 between	 conflict,	
property	rights,	and	land	governance	in	the	Panzi	neighborhood	of	Bukavu,	
the	 provincial	 capital	 of	 South	 Kivu.	 Bukavu	 is	 separated	 from	 Rwanda	
by	 Lake	Kivu	 and	 the	Ruzizi	 River	 and	 is	 situated	 at	 1460	meters	 above	
sea	 level.	 Administratively,	 Bukavu	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 municipalities:	
Ibanda,	Kadutu	 and	 Bagira.	 Together,	 they	 cover	 an	 area	 of	 60km2.	The	
neighborhood	 of	 Panzi	 is	 situated	 in	 the	 municipality	 of	 Ibanda	 and	 is	
subdivided	into	six	cellules1	and	82	avenues.	This	brief	uses	a	mixed-methods	
approach.	The	 empirical	 base	 of	 the	 paper	 consists	 of	 approximately	 100	
qualitative	 interviews	with	 different	 kinds	 of	 interlocutors	 including	 state	
officials	 situated	 at	 various	 levels	 and	 residents.	 The	 quantitative	 part	 of	
the	research	is	based	on	a	survey	of	375	heads	of	household	selected	using	a	
random	sampling	method.		
	 Property	 rights	 are	 notoriously	 precarious	 in	 Panzi,	 as	 they	
are	 in	 other	 urban	 areas	 of	 eastern	 Congo.	 Several	 factors	 contribute	 to	
this	 situation.	 They	 include	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 Congolese	 land	 legislation,	
rampant	corruption	in	the	land	administration,	rising	demographic	pressure,	
widespread	 land	 speculation,	 the	 lack	 of	 coherent	 urban	 planning,	 and	
competition	between	the	country’s	various	land	governance	authorities	in	the	
region	(van	Overbeek	and	Tamás	2018,	291;	Wagemakers	et	al.	2009;	Peyton	
2018).	The	compounding	effect	created	by	the	interaction	of	these	different	
factors	has	prompted	exasperated	Congolese	citizens	to	refer	to	urban	land	
governance	 as	 “anarchic	 urbanization,”	 “property	 anarchy,”	 or	 “anarchic	
constructions”	(Verweijen	2015,	353;	Büscher	2012,	495;	Wagemakers	et	al.	
2009,	176).	NGOs,	Panzi	residents,	and	Bukavu’s	 land	authorities	refer	 to	
“anarchy”	frequently.	The	notion	of	anarchy	is	deployed	to	criticize	others	
for	failing	to	comply	with	the	law.	Land	authorities	in	Bukavu	often	accuse	
residents	of	anarchic	constructions.	Conversely,	residents	and	NGOs	accuse	
land	authorities	of	promoting	anarchic	constructions.	Land	authorities	also	
mutually	accuse	each	other	of	being	responsible	for	anarchic	constructions.	
In	 this	 research	 brief	 we	 argue	 that	 these	 references	 to	 “anarchy”	 and	
“disorder”	are	not	to	be	taken	at	face	value,	but	should	rather	be	seen	as	part	
of	the	ongoing	struggle	to	define	the	rules	of	land	governance	in	the	Congo.	
	 The	struggle	to	define	the	rules	of	land	governance	in	the	Congo	
exposes	 a	 curious	 puzzle	 about	 land	 governance	 in	 the	Congo:	 the	 law	 is	
simultaneously	 fetishized	and	disregarded.	Neither	Panzi	 residents	nor	 the	
various	authorities	involved	in	land	governance	seem	particularly	concerned	
with	respecting	the	law.	However,	their	reasons	for	disregarding	the	law	and	
idealizing	the	law	are	very	different.	On	the	one	hand,	the	various	authorities	
involved	 in	 land	 governance	 deploy	 the	 law	 as	 a	 language	 and	 a	 tactic	 of	
power.	They	fetishize	the	law	as	a	symbol	of	sovereignty,	and	they	use	it	to	
assert	 their	authority	to	exercise	 jurisdiction	over	 land	 issues	and	to	 justify	
the	extraction	of	unofficial	 income	from	Panzi	 residents.	 In	 this	way,	 land	
authorities	deploy	the	language	of	the	law	to	create	an	alternative	order	that	
facilitates	 irregular	 resource	 extraction	 from	Panzi	 residents.	On	 the	other	
hand,	 Panzi	 residents	 tend	 to	 fetishize	 the	 law	 as	 an	 ideal	 of	 governance.	
Their	 understanding	 of	 the	 law	 as	 an	 instrument	 meant	 to	 protect	 their	
property	rights	speaks	to	their	 faith	 in	the	 law	and	 its	capacity	to	generate	
order.	However,	in	reality,	the	law	rarely	protects	the	property	rights	of	Panzi	
residents.	As	consequence,	to	establish	a	minimum	degree	of	tenure	security,	
people	tend	to	either	circumvent	the	law	or	play	along	with	the	alternative	
rules	imposed	by	the	land	authorities.	In	doing	so,	they	involuntarily	become	
complicit	in	the	“misrule	of	law”	(Holston	1991).
	 As	 such,	 we	 argue	 in	 this	 research	 brief	 that	 the	 phenomenon	
of	 anarchic	 constructions	 is	 not	 the	 result	 of	 a	 spontaneous	 and	 chaotic	
process	of	urbanization.	Rather,	as	we	show,	it	is	a	set	of	practices,	in	which	
the	 law—paradoxically—is	 applied	 in	 a	 calculated	way	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
vast	majority	of	people’s	plots	and	buildings	 in	effect	do	not	comply	with	
the	 law.	Consequently,	most	Panzi	 residents’	 property	 rights	 are	 temporal	
and	ephemeral.	However,	the	disenfranchisement	of	people’s	land	rights	in	
this	case	is	not	the	work	of	a	grand	conspiracy	by	Bukavu’s	land	authorities.	
Rather,	 the	 regime	 of	 practices	 is	 upheld	 by	 a	 myriad	 of	 micro-practices	
of	 power,	 enacted	 by	 a	 multitude	 of	 land	 authorities	 that	 compete	 and	
collaborate	with	each	other	in	unpredictable	patterns.
CONFLICT, MIGRATION, AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH IN PANZI
The	conflicts	of	eastern	Congo	have	had	a	deeply	 transformative	effect	on	
urban	 space,	 land	 governance,	 and	 property	 rights	 in	 Bukavu.	 Bukavu’s	
population	 and	 built-up	 area	 have	 grown	 significantly	 since	 the	 1970s.	
Between	 1970	 and	 2002	 (near	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Second	Congo	War	 [1998-
2003])	 the	 population	 of	 Bukavu	 increased	 from	 142,181	 residents	 to	 an	
estimated	450,000.	Between	2002	and	2007	the	population	grew	to	556,885,	
and	between	2007	and	2017	the	population	swelled	to	1,184,973,	an	increase	
of	112.8	percent	in	ten	years	(see	table	1)	2.
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Panzi	has	also	grown	rapidly.	Between	2006	and	2017	the	population	
grew	from	75,554	to	133,222,	an	increase	of	82.6	percent	(see	table	
2).
Our	survey	data	demonstrates	that	89.5	percent	of	residents	migrated	
to	Panzi	during	their	lifetime.	Rural-urban	migration	accounted	for	
roughly	 50	 percent	 of	 Panzi’s	 growth.	 The	 remaining	 50	 percent	
migrated	from	another	urban	area.	Research	on	the	transformation	
of	 eastern	 Congo’s	 urban	 areas	 suggests	 that	 the	 region’s	 violent	
conflicts	and	 insecurity	drove	 rural-urban	migration	 (Peyton	2018,	
213;	 Büscher	 2012,	 494;	 Sadiki	 et	 al.	 2010,	 2013).	 However,	 the	
research	 shows	 that	 insecurity	 was	 not	 the	 predominant	 reason	
people	moved	to	Panzi.	Instead,	the	reason	most	frequently	cited	by	
rural	migrants	was	“lower	living	costs”	(42.4	percent).	By	comparison,	
“security”	 was	 the	 second-most	 frequently	 cited	 reason	 (18.6	
percent).	 “Employment”	 was	 third	 (15.1	 percent).	 These	 reasons	
cannot	be	isolated	from	each	other,	as	insecurity	can	impact	people’s	
living	costs	and	employment	opportunities	and	vice-versa.	Yet	these	
results	serve	as	a	reminder	that	people’s	reasons	for	migrating	from	a	
rural	to	an	urban	area	in	eastern	Congo	are	often	fundamentally,	of	a	
social	and	economic	nature,	and	in	any	case	quite	diverse.
	 While,	the	city	has	grown	demographically	its	built-up	area	
has	 not	 grown	 substantially	 (see	Map	 2).	Officially,	 the	 city	 limits	
have	 not	 changed,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 the	 population	 pressure	 on	 the	
available	land	has	increased.	However,	the	city	limits	have	spilled	over	
into	Kabare	territory,	especially	in	the	area	south	of	Panzi	(see	Map	
2).	Consequently,	 just	 as	 in	other	urban	centers	 in	 eastern	Congo,	
the	value	of	 land	has	 risen	 sharply	 since	 the	beginning	of	 the	wars	
in	the	1990s.	For	 instance,	David	Peyton	(2018,	2012)	reports	that	
the	average	value	of	a	square	meter	of	land	increased	more	than	3500	
percent	from	1998	to	2016	in	Beni	in	North	Kivu.	While	we	do	not	
possess	similar	statistical	indicators	for	Bukavu,	respondents	regularly	
mentioned	 that	 land	has	become	very	expensive.	 In	 the	words	of	a	
resident	of	Panzi:	“One	of	the	biggest	difficulties	for	the	population	
here	is	that	the	price	to	acquire	a	land	plot	is	enormous.	However,	the	
population	here	is	largely	very	poor.”3
ACCESS TO LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PANZI
There	are	several	statutory	institutions	involved	in	land	governance	in	Panzi.	
The	most	 important	ones	 are	 the	Cadastre	 (Land	Registry	Office),	which	
is	 linked	to	the	Ministère des Affaires Foncières	 (Ministry	of	Land	Affairs);	
the Division d’Urbanisme et Habitation	(Department	of	Urbanisation	and	
Housing),	which	 is	 in	charge	of	 enforcing	urban	planning	guidelines;	 and	
the Maisons Communales	 (Communal	Offices),	headed	by	a	burgomaster.	
In	addition	there	 is	 the	 so-called	cadre de base	 (grassroots	executives).	The	
cadres de base	are	 local	chiefs	associated	with	the	Mairie	 (Mayor’s	Office),	
which	oversees	the	Communal	Offices.	The cadre de base is	organized	within	
a	 pyramidal	 administrative	 structure	 and	 is	 headed	 by	 a	 chef de quartier 
(neighborhood	chief).	Neighborhood	chiefs	who	play	an	important	role	in	
land	governance,	 and	 especially	 the	 resolution	of	 land	disputes	 are	official	
entities	 recognized	by	 law,	but	 their	own	subordinates	are	not	granted	the	
status	of	a	civil	servant.
	 Officially,	 there	 are	 no	more	 available	 plots	 in	 Panzi.4	 Yet	 some	
actors	claim	that	plots	are	still	being	sold	on	the	banks	of	the	Ruzizi	River	
even	 though	 much	 of	 this	 area	 is	 deemed	 unfit	 for	 construction	 (non 
aedificandi)	due	to	its	steep	slopes	and	the	risk	of	soil	erosion,	and	mud-	and	
landslides.
 However,	there	are	other	ways	in	which	people	moving	to	Panzi	can	
get	access	to	land:	by	renting,	through	inheritance,	by	buying	an	existing	plot,	
or	by	buying	a	parcel	of	an	existing	plot.	In	recent	years,	the	latter	solution	has	
become	increasingly	popular	due	to	the	lack	of	available	plots	situated	on	safe	
construction	sites.	This	practice	simultaneously	enables	existing	plot	owners	
to	profit	from	the	rising	property	market	and	allows	relatively	poor	people	to	
get	access	to	land	in	the	city,	regardless	of	whether	they	come	from	another	
urban	area	or	a	rural	area.	People	who	wish	to	acquire	land	in	Panzi	can	do	
so	either	by	contacting	the	seller	directly,	approaching	one	of	the	cadres de 
base,	who	often	have	good	knowledge	about	the	situation	in	the	entities	they	
administer,	or	by	approaching	one	of	Bukavu’s	commissionaires (real estate 
agents),	who	facilitate	the	contact	between	the	seller	and	the	buyer	for	a	fee	
of	approximately	5	percent	of	 the	overall	price.	The	 latter	has	become	the	
preferred	option	in	recent	years,	as	it	is	cheaper	than	going	through	a	cadre 
de base.	In	order	to	avoid	meddling	by	authorities,	people	increasingly	make	
land	deals	during	the	night.	This	practice	frustrates	the	cadres de base,	who	
not	only	lose	out	on	income,	but	whose	control	over	land	governance	issues	
Table 2
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is	diminished	by	this	practice.
	 Property	 rights	 are	 tenuous	 in	 Panzi	 for	 various	 reasons.	 First,	
since	 the	passing	 of	 the	 current	 land	 law,	 the	 1966	 so-called	Bakajika	 law,	
amended	in	1973	and	1980,	definitive	private	land	rights	do	not	exist	in	the	
Congo.	The	Bakajika	 law	 is	 a	 series	 of	 laws	 that	 nationalized	 all	 land	 and	
recognized	 the	 state	 as	 the	 supreme	proprietor	 and	owner	of	 the	national	
soil,	as	well	as	all	resources	located	in	the	sub-soils	of	the	national	territory.	
The	Bakajika	law	stipulated	that	land	could	be	individually	bought	and	sold	
and	 protected	 by	 a	Certificat d’Enregistrement	 (certificate	 of	 ownership),	
which	 is	 delivered	 by	 the	 conservateur des titres immobiliers	 (custodian	 of	
property	titles)	in	collaboration	with	the	Services de Cadastre	(Land	Registry	
Office).	However,	 it	 also	 stipulates	 that	 the	 land	 can	 be	 reclaimed	 by	 the	
state	if	doing	so	is	 in	the	interest	of	the	state.	This	means	that	land	can	be	
legally	expropriated	on	the	basis	of	the	state’s	supreme	authority.	In	essence,	
people	only	have	user	rights	for	purchased	land	in	the	Congo.	For	instance,	
recently	a	new	road	was	built	southward	in	the	direction	of	the	Plaine de la 
Ruzizi in Panzi.	During	 construction,	 several	houses	 along	 the	 road	were	
demolished	or	halfway	demolished.	In	such	cases,	people	would	only	receive	
compensation	for	buildings	on	the	land,	but	not	for	the	expropriation	of	the	
land	itself,	and	only	 if	 they	have	a	certificate	of	ownership.	But	even	then,	
in	some	cases	powerful,	wealthy,	and	well-connected	individuals	have	been	
able	to	successfully	expropriate	people	who	possess	all	the	right	documents	
without	any	compensation	whatsoever.
	 Secondly,	Panzi	is	a	poor	neighborhood.	According	to	our	survey,	
the	average	cash	annual	income	is	875	USD	per	person,	or	2.4	USD	per	day.	
While	this	average	is	above	the	global	poverty	line	at	1.90	USD,	63.5	percent	
of	 our	 sampled	 households	 do	 indeed	 live	 below	 the	 global	 poverty	 line.	
This	measurement	 indicates	 that	most	 residents	 cannot	 afford	 to	 acquire	
the	necessary	certificate	of	ownership	from	the	Land	Registry.	The	process	
is	slow,	expensive,	and	nontransparent,	and	the	outcome	is	uncertain.	The	
price	of	 the	certificate	of	ownership	 is	 said	 to	vary	between	500	and	1200	
USD.	The	certificate	of	ownership	is,	therefore,	out	of	reach	for	most	Panzi	
residents.	 This	 consequence	 is	 reflected	 in	 our	 survey,	 which	 shows	 that	
only	11.9	percent	of	Panzi	residents	have	acquired	the	required	certificate	of	
ownership.	Moreover,	the	survey	shows	that	there	is	a	statistically	significant	
relationship	between	high	household	income	and	possession	of	a	certificate	
of	ownership.	However,	in	contrast,	23.9	percent	of	Panzi	residents	possess	
what	is	called	a	contrat de location,	a	lease	contract	you	sign	with	the	Land	
Registry	 for	 the	 plot.	 It	 obliges	 the	 titleholder	 to	 construct	 a	 building	 in	
durable	materials	within	36	months,	which	in	effect	only	makes	ownership	
and	construction	of	the	land	more	expensive.	If	you	do	not	comply	with	this	
requirement,	you	run	the	risk	of	losing	your	property.
	 However,	alternative	 title	documents	can	be	obtained.	They	are	
the Attestations d’Occupation Parcellaire	(Proof	of	Occupation	of	Plot)	and	
the Attestations de Propriété (Proof	of	Ownership).	The	 former	 are	 issued	
by the Division d’Urbanisme et Habitation	 (Department	 of	Urbanisation	
and	 Housing),	 while	 the	 latter	 are	 issued	 by	 the	 Maisons Communales 
(Communal	Offices)	of	which	there	are	three,	one	for	each	Municipality	of	
Bukavu	(Ibanda,	Kadutu	and	Bagira).	However,	these	alternative	documents	
are	in	fact	competing	versions	of	the	same	deed.	Both	documents	are	valid	
only	if	the	plot	owner	constructs	a	building	in	semi-durable	material.	If	the	
plot	owner	fails	to	do	so,	the	document	is	no	longer	considered	valid	by	the	
A part of the neighborhood of Panzi built on the steep slopes of the Ruzizi River.
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authorities.	The	legal	status	of	these	title	deeds	became	uncertain	with	the	
passing	of	the	land	law	of	1973.	Of	the	two,	the	Proof	of	Ownership	issued	
by	 the	Communal	Cffices	 is	 the	 deed	most	 frequently	 possessed	by	Panzi	
residents,	as	30.8	percent	of	our	respondents	possess	 this	 type	of	deed.	By	
comparison,	13.9	percent	possesses	the	Proof	of	Occupation	of	Plot,	issued	
by	the	Department	of	Urbanisation	and	Housing.	There	are	both	historical	
and	economic	reasons	for	why	most	people	possess	the	Proof	of	Ownership	
rather	 than	 the	 Proof	 of	 Occupation	 of	 Plot.	 Until	 2007	 it	 was	 the	
prerogative	of	the	Communal	Offices	to	issue	this	document,	which	means	
that	many	older	land	deeds	are	of	this	type.	At	the	same	time	it	is	the	least	
expensive	document	of	 the	two,	which	makes	 it	more	accessible	 to	Panzi’s	
predominately	 poor	 population.	 The	 price	 for	 the	 Proof	 of	 Ownership	
varies	between	80	and	250	USD.	By	comparison	the	Proof	of	Occupation	of	
Plot	issued	by	the	Department	of	Urbanisation	and	Housing,	is	said	to	cost	
around	400	USD.
	 However,	there	is	a	fourth	document	that	Panzi	residents	may	use	
to	protect	their	property.	This	document	is	the	acte de vente	(bill	of	sale).	It	is	
the	document	most	frequently	owned	by	Panzi	residents,	as	59.7	percent	of	
the	respondents	possess	a	bill	of	sale.	A	bill	of	sale	is	an	agreement	between	
the	buyer	and	the	seller	of	a	plot.	It	contains	the	terms	and	the	price	of	the	
transaction.	The	bill	 of	 sale	 is	 one	of	 the	precursor	documents	needed	 to	
obtain	a	certificate	of	ownership.	People	in	Panzi	are	mostly	aware	that	the	
bill	of	sale	is	not	enough	to	grant	them	full	legal	(alienable)	property	rights,	
but	it	is,	nonetheless,	used	as	a	valid	land	title	in	transactions	in	Panzi	as	many	
people	cannot	afford	any	of	the	alternative	deeds.	Indeed,	our	survey	showed	
that	there	was	no	relationship	between	household	income	and	ownership	of	
a	bill	of	sale.	Many	people	seemed	resigned	to	accept	that	the	bill	of	sale	is	as	
good	as	it	gets	in	terms	of	securing	their	property	rights.	Said	a	resident	of	
Panzi:	“I	only	have	a	bill	of	sale.	I	know	it	is	not	enough,	but	I	don’t	have	the	
means	to	buy	another	document,	such	as	the	one	from	the	Land	Registry.”5 
Nevertheless,	people’s	lack	of	officially	valid	title	deeds	make	them	vulnerable	
to	 extraction	 and	 extortion	 by	 land	 authorities	 and	 ultimately	 also	 to	
expropriation.
RENT-SEEKING AND TENURE (IN)SECURITY
With	a	few	exceptions,	Congolese	state	institutions	are	characterized	by	low	
levels	of	 legitimacy,	drastic	resource	shortfalls,	and	technical	shortcomings.	
In	 spite	 of	 this,	 Congolese	 state	 institutions	 persist	 and	 even	 proliferate	
(Trefon	 2009).	 To	 a	 large	 extent,	 Congolese	 state	 agents	 are	 able	 to	 keep	
their	institutions	running	by	leveraging	their	position	in	the	social	order	to	
impose	various	taxes,	service	fees,	and	fines	on	Congolese	citizens	(Eriksson	
Baaz	and	Olsson	2011;	Eriksson	Baaz	and	Verweijen	2013).	The	Congolese	
countryside,	for	instance,	is	littered	with	roadblocks	where	various	Congolese	
security	services	and	armed	groups	demand	taxes	in	various	form	from	people	
passing	by	 (Verweijen	2015;	Schouten	et	 al.	2017;	Hoffmann	et	 al.	2016).	
The	administration	of	land	in	Bukavu	is	no	different	in	this	regard.	In	fact,	
the	high	value	of	land	in	Bukavu	means	that	it	is	a	highly	profitable	sector	of	
public	administration.	State	agents	involved	in	land	governance	can	be	frank	
about	about	their	extractive	practices.6	Said	an	agent	from	the	Department	
of	Urbanisation	and	Housing:	“Normally	the	tax	for	a	Proof	of	Occupation	
of	Plot	is	30	USD,	however,	this	tax	needs	[additional]	administrative	fees	to	
supplement	the	costs	of	creating	the	title	deed.”7  
	 These	 administrative	 fees	 are	 only	 some	 of	 the	 many	 forms	 of	
resource	 extraction	 from	 Panzi	 residents	 that	 Congolese	 land	 authorities	
engage	 in.	 Congolese	 land	 authorities	 make	 verification	 missions	 to	 the	
field,	 ostensibly	 to	 check	 if	 people’s	 constructions	 and	 plots	 comply	with	
regulations.	In	reality,	however,	authorities	often	carry	out	these	missions	in	
order	to	pressure	people	into	paying	a	fee	for	their	inevitable	transgressions	
without	a	mechanism	for	bringing	people	in	compliance	with	the	rules	and	
often	without	issuing	an	official	receipt	for	the	payment	of	the	“service”	they	
provided.	
	 It	is	easy	to	find	plots	and	constructions	in	Panzi	that	do	not	comply	
with	the	regulations.	Due	to	the	high	density	of	housing	and	people,	Panzi	
residents	have	often	build	on	sites	that	are	unfit	for	construction,	transgress	
boundaries	 of	 easements	 and	 public	 space,	 or	 redirect	 overland	 sewers	 to	
make	 space	 for	 their	buildings.	Moreover,	as	we	have	 shown,	people	often	
do	 not	 possess	 the	 documents	 and	 deeds	 required	 by	 the	 law.	 The	 land	
authorities are partly responsible for the situation as urban plots are not 
always	 adequately	 measured,	 certificates	 are	 issued	 for	 unsafe	 land,	 and	
institutions	 rarely	cooperate	 in	 the	evaluation	and	administration	of	 these	
plots	and	houses.	Not	only	do	land	authorities	not	always	collaborate	but,	
they	often	compete	over	 the	 rents	of	public	office.	As	 an	 employee	 in	 the	
Department	of	Urbanisation	and	Housing	noted:	“It	is	a	conflict	of	interest.	
The	Communal	Houses	and	 the	Department	oppose	each	otherregarding	
who	has	the	right	to	issue	this	document.”8  
	 In	this	manner,	authorities	of	one	institution	may	explicitly	invalidate	
titles	 delivered	 by	 competing	 state	 authorities	 (van	Overbeek	 2014).	 This	
competition	weighs	heavily	on	Panzi	 residents	who	can	never	know	 if	 the	
recognition	 they	 have	 received	 from	 a	 land	 authority	 is	 going	 to	 be	 valid	
when	another	one	decides	to	pay	them	a	visit.	As	one	resident	put	it:
There is a competition between the different land and property 
authorities. When one of them comes he has a tendency to ignore 
and dismiss the work of the other authorities and he tells that 
his service is the only one that can help you and that you should 
therefore place your trust in them. Since that is how it is, you pay 
them something. But then others come and tell you the same 
thing and that the money you had just paid is wasted. All of this 
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harassment means that we have no confidence in anybody.9
This	 competition	 is	 compounded	 by	 the	 at-best	 derisory	 payment	 that	
state	 officials	 receive	 as	 compensation	 for	 their	 work.	 State	 officials	 adapt	
by	seeking	out	potential	claimants	to	whom	they	may	issue	certificates,	and	
transgressions	they	may	resolve	or	issue	fines	for	(van	Overbeek	2014).
	 Knowing	 full	well	how	widespread	 transgressive	 land	practices	 are,	
land	authorities	pressure	residents	to	pay	for	their	transgressions	yet	without	
issuing	any	kind	of	official	recognition	of	their	rights	to	own	their	plot	and	
to	build	on	it.	Overall	34.4	percent	(93)	of	households	reported	having	paid	
something	to	various	authorities	to	protect	their	property	over	the	past	12	
months.	Average	payments	for	those	households	amounted	to	101	USD	(an	
average	of	around	5.8	percent	of	their	total	household	income).
	 The	uncertainty	of	 tenure	security	and	the	selective	deployment	of	
the	law	provided	a	basis	for	Panzi	residents’	distrust	of	the	land	authorities.	
Said	one	resident	of	Bukavu’s	land	authorities:
[The authorities] do everything they can in order not to inform us 
about how to acquire a title and about how much that may cost. And 
even when they do tell you, they do everything they can to hide the 
truth about the prices of the different documents you need. In that 
way they can keep you in a situation where you are always guilty so 
they can force you to negotiate with them.10
According	to	another:
All these authorities involved in land governance do nothing for 
us the inhabitants. They are only looking for their own part when 
someone sells a house or a plot. We have faith in no one. Only God 
is just.11
LAND CONFLICTS
A	 high	 frequency	 of	 land	 conflicts	 is	 one	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 Panzi’s	
“property	anarchy”	is	the	high	frequency	of	land	conflicts.	33.9	percent	of	
our	respondents	reported	to	have	been	in	a	land	conflict	during	the	preceding	
12	months.	The	majority	of	 these	 land	conflicts	 are	over	plot	boundaries.	
These	conflicts	often	emerge	because	people	try	to	push	the	limits	of	their	
plots	 into	 a	 neighbor’s	 plot.	 Torrential	 rains	 seasonally	 contribute	 to	 the	
frequency	 of	 these	 conflicts,	 as	 they	 may	 erase	 the	 boundaries	 between	
plots,	especially	when	they	result	in	mud-	or	landslides.	These	may	destroy	
houses	 and	 result	 in	 death	 or	 injury.	When	 such	 events	 occur,	 it	may	 be	
difficult	to	reconstruct	the	 limits	between	plots,	which	 in	turn	can	 lead	to	
conflicts	between	neighbors.	It	may	also	lead	to	a	public	blame	game	between	
authorities	 over	 who	 is	 responsible	 for	 allowing	 people	 to	 build	 on	 sites	
that	are	not	suited	for	construction.	Other	frequent	forms	of	land	conflict	
relate	 to	 the	 channeling	 of	waterways	 and	 sewage,	 the	 blocking	 of	 public	
passageways,	and	inheritance	conflicts.	
	 It	is	important	to	note	that	authorities	are	not	equally	distrusted.	The	
cadres de base	seem	to	be	more	trusted	than	the	others	because	it	is	perceived	
that	 they	 actually	 help	 solve	 people’s	 problems,	 especially	 people’s	 land	
related	problems	with	their	neighbors	and	family	members.	However,	they	
also	 help	 solve	 other	 pressing	 problems	 such	 as	 curbing	 crime	 (Perazzone	
2018).
	 In	45.81	percent	of	the	cases,	a	cadre de base	was	the	first	authority	
people	 went	 to	 when	 there	 was	 a	 land-related	 conflict.	 Moreover,	 the	
majority	(55.49	percent)	of	the	payments	made	to	authorities	were	paid	to	a	
cadre de base.	By	comparison,	25.61	percent	had	paid	something	to	the	land	
authorities,	while	13.41	percent	had	paid	something	to	the	police.	In	general,	
people	only	approach	the	judicial	system	or	land	authorities	when	the	parties	
are	 not	 able	 to	 solve	 a	 land	 conflict	 themselves	 (29.1	 percent	 preferred	 to	
not	approach	any	authorities)	or	with	the	help	of	a	cadre de base or other 
nonofficial	authority,	 such	as	a	church	 leader	or	a	 local	notable.	There	are	
three	main	reasons	for	this.	Firstly,	cadres de base	are	cheaper	to	commission	
than	 higher-level	 authorities.	 Secondly,	 they	 are	 generally	 more	 trusted.	
Thirdly,	they	are	focused	on	finding	a	compromise	that	works	for	all	parties	
involved,	often	referred	to	as	an	“arrangement à l’amiable”	(a	friendly	deal),	
which	helps	 to	avoid	escalation.	As	one	Panzi	 resident	mentioned:	“I	only	
have	faith	in	the	cadres de base	because	they	are	there	to	accompany	us	and	to	
support	me	in	solving	my	problem	with	the	former	owner	of	the	plot.	After	
that	I	paid	them	a	little	bit	as	a	sign	of	gratitude.”	Moreover,	the	cadres de 
base	live	among	Panzi	residents	and	thus	share	many	of	the	same	difficult	life	
conditions	and	have	social	relations	and	daily	interactions	with	them.	All	this	
indicates	that	there	is	a	sense	of	community	between	the	cadres de base	and	
the	Panzi	residents	based	on	personal	relations,	shared	hardship,	and	the	need	
to	solve	pressing	problems.	One	of	the	shared	concerns	between	the	residents	
and	the	cadres de base	seems	to	be	keeping	the	higher-level	authorities	away	as	
a	means	to	avoid	escalation	and	higher	costs.	By	solving	land	issues	at	the	level	
of the avenue,	cellule,	or	quartier,	residents	and	cadres de base	can	redistribute	
resources	 among	members	 of	 the	 community,	 rather	 than	 be	 extorted	 by	
distant	authorities	looking	to	line	their	pockets.
	 However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 residents	 generally	 have	 an	
ambiguous	 relationship	with	 the	 cadres de base.	This	 is	 largely	due	 to	 the	
latter’s	position	as	intermediaries	between	higher-level	authorities	and	Panzi	
residents.	Much	 like	customary	chiefs	 in	 the	 rural	areas,	 the	 role	of	 cadres 
de base	 is	very	important	for	the	higher-level	authorities	who	rely	on	them	
due	to	their	status	as	local	notables	and	because	they	have	good	knowledge	
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of	what	is	going	on	in	the	entities	they	govern.	One	chef d’avenue	remarked:	
“the	cadres de base	are	like	scouts	for	the	authorities.	We	are	mines	of	precious	
information.	We	are	the	ones	that	have	all	the	information	about	land	in	our	
entities”.12	Indeed,	several	residents	accused	them	of	collaborating	with	the	
other	 land	 authorities	 in	pointing	out	 transgressions,	 and	 for	 selling	plots	
even	 though	 they	 have	 no	 right	 to	 do	 so	 according	 to	 the	 land	 law,	 and	
despite	some	of	the	plots	being	unfit	for	construction	or	are	built	on	public	
land.
	 Panzi	residents	are	not	equally	exposed	to	the	practices	of	rent-seeking	
by	land	authorities	in	Bukavu.	Nor	are	they	equally	likely	to	have	a	satisfactory	
outcome	 in	a	 land	conflict.	As	 stated	above	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 statistical	
relationship	 between	 high	 household	 income	 and	 having	 a	 certificate	 of	
ownership.	People	who	have	 the	necessary	financial	means	are	able	 to	buy	
a	 certificate	of	 ownership	 from	 the	 conservateur des titres immobiliers	 and	
the Cadastre.	This	is	usually	enough	to	protect	them	against	expropriation	
and	encroaching	neighbors	or	 competing	claims	 to	 the	plot	 in	 the	 case	of	
multiple	claimants.	Moreover,	with	sufficient	financial	means,	one	can	pay	
soldiers	to	protect	one’s	property	in	case	of	a	land	conflict	with	a	neighbor.	
Money	 also	 enables	 people	 to	 bring	 their	 land	 conflicts	 before	 the	 court,	
whose	rulings	can	also	be	swayed	by	money.	However,	no	one	in	our	survey	
had	actually	taken	this	step.	There	are	other	ways	also	by	which	people	can	
protect	their	plot.	Alongside	using	one’s	financial	means,	the	most	effective	
way	to	protect	one’s	property	or	to	gain	the	upper	hand	in	a	 land	conflict	
is	 by	 mobilizing	 social	 relations.	 This	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 traffic d’influence 
(influence	peddling)	or	using	one’s	parapluie	(umbrella).	As	one	resident	put	
it:	“Some	residents	who	are	friends	of	the	authorities	do	not	hesitate	to	use	
their	influence	and	surround	themselves	with	soldiers,	especially	when	they	
build	their	constructions.”13	According	to	another:
 
The authorities privilege those who have connections or family 
members or are friends of politicians, especially provincial 
ministers and deputies. These people do not have to pay the money 
Map 1.  Bukavu
8 CONSTRUCTED ANARCHY: GOVERNANCE, CONFLICT AND PRECARIOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BUKAVU, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
that we pay to the police or the agents who come to control us. It 
makes us angry and it is not good.14
And	a	third:
The Congolese state is not committed to protecting its citizens and 
their property. On the contrary, it tries to strip them of the little 
things that they posses. It locks its system. In order to unlock it, 
you have to use influence peddling via one’s important connections: 
deputies, ministers, or military or police officers.15
In	other	words,	people’s	social	and	economic	position	in	society,	as	reflected	
in	 the	 economic	 resources	 and	 social	 relations	 they	 are	 able	 to	 mobilize,	
are	 the	main	 factors	 shaping	 the	degree	 to	which	 their	property	 rights	 are	
recognized	and	protected.
	 The	 issue	 of	 property	 rights	 is	 among	 the	 most	 important	 issues	
facing	Panzi	residents.	Yet	for	most	people,	property	rights	are	elusive.	This	is	
partly	due	to	the	legislation,	which	denies	people	definitive	property	rights.	
However,	 our	 research	 suggests	 that	 practices	 of	 governance,	 rather	 than	
deficiencies	 in	the	law,	are	the	main	causes	of	tenure	insecurity	in	Bukavu.	
These	practices	produce	and	reproduce	an	unequal	social	structure	of	power	
relations,	where	people’s	economic	assets	and	the	relative	power	of	their	social	
relations	 strongly	 condition	 their	 access	 to	 land	 and	 their	property	 rights.	
The	driving	rationale	behind	these	practices	 is	economic	rather	than	 legal.	
People’s	property	rights	are	withheld	from	them	with	the	aim	of	generating	
resources	for	the	land	authorities.	This	means	that	land	authorities	de	facto	
use	 the	 law	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 keep	 people	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 permanent	
illegality,	which	makes	 them	vulnerable	 to	extortion.	Hence,	while	Panzi’s	
land	authorities	mobilize	the	law,	they	do	not	typically	do	so	to	bring	people	
in	compliance	with	it.	Instead,	they	use	the	law	as	an	instrument	to	threaten	
residents	 into	 a	 negotiating	 a	 transgression	 fee	 or	 fine.	 In	 this	 way,	 Panzi	
residents	are	able	acquire	a	kind	of	temporary	right	to	break	the	 law,	until	
the	next	authority	comes	along	asking	for	another	fee.	In	Bukavu,	in	most	
cases	money	can	buy	a	person	a	plot,	a	house,	and	the	necessary	documents	
to	render	the	acquired	property	legal.	However,	in	order	to	truly	enjoy	the	
security	 that	 comes	 with	 obtaining	 legal	 status,	 you	 also	 need	 protection	
from	powerful	 individuals	capable	of	enforcing	your	property	rights.	This	
makes	 it	 almost	 impossible	 for	 all	 but	 the	well-off	 and	well-connected	 to	
possess	perennial	rights	in	Bukavu.
	 Panzi	 residents	 and	 the	 various	 authorities	 involved	 with	 land	
governance	can	all	agree	that	Panzi’s	process	of	urbanization	is	anarchic	and	
fundamentally	disregards	the	 law.	However,	 they	do	not	at	all	agree	about	
who	is	to	blame.	Panzi	residents	tend	to	blame	the	authorities,	especially	the	
higher-level	 authorities	 such	 as	 those	 of	 the	Department	 of	Housing	 and	
Urbanisation	and	the	Land	Registry	Office.	As	one	resident	remarked:
The law is not respected. There is corruption and influence peddling 
of the land authorities by those who have built property, for example 
on public land, such as those who have built on the easements 
and roads. Before 2000 all of Bukavu’s neighbourhoods could be 
accessed by car. This is no longer the case due to the effect of 
anarchic constructions.16
For	their	part,	the	cadre de base	accuse	both	Panzi	residents	and	the	higher-
level	authorities	of	being	responsible	for	the	“anarchy.”	According	to	one	chef 
d’avenue	(head	of	avenue):
[The land authorities] come to sell dangerous land. They even sell 
off the easements. When they have gone we are left behind with the 
consequences of their immorality. They don’t guide people to avoid 
anarchic constructions. Instead they give in to corruption and sell 
plots that they do not have the right to sell.17
The	higher-level	land	authorities	blame	the	residents	and	the	cadres de base 
for	 the	anarchic	constructions.	For	 instance,	according	to	a	chef de bureau 
in	 the	 Mayor’s	 Office,	 the	 cadres de base are largely responsible for the 
proliferation	of	anarchic	constructions	since	they	sell	off	plots	that	are	not	
fit	for	construction.
Map 2. The growth of Bukavu’s built-up areas
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CONCLUSION: WHO’S ANARCHY?
Property	rights	are	highly	tenuous	for	the	vast	majority	of	Panzi	residents.	
Only	 11.9	 per	 cent	 of	 our	 respondents	 possess	 the	 required	 certificate	 of	
ownership.	According	to	Congolese	land	legislation,	this	is	the	only	title	deed	
that	confers	valid	property	rights	to	people,	albeit	these	are	only	user	rights.	
Due	 to	 the	 difficulty	 of	 obtaining	 such	 a	 certificate	 of	 ownership,	 Panzi	
residents	possess	a	number	of	alternative	documents,	which	they	are	able	to	
use	as	proxies	for	a	legally	valid	title	deed,	including	the	bill	of	sale	between	
the	 seller	 and	 the	 buyer	 of	 a	 given	 plot,	 which	 does	 not	 confer	 property	
rights,	unless	connected	to	a	certificate	of	ownership	at	 the	Land	Registry	
Office.	Nevertheless,	the	bill	of	sale	is	treated	as	valid	among	Panzi	residents	
and	to	some	extent	by	the	cadres de base	and	as	such,	confers	a	minor	degree	
of	 tenure	 security	 to	 those	 people	 who	 possess	 it.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	
protect	residents	against	rent-seeking	authorities	or	people	with	the	means	
to	purchase	an	ownership	certificate	for	the	same	plot.	Moreover,	if	a	state	
institution	decides	that	the	state	is	in	need	of	that	plot,	without	a	certificate	
of	 ownership,	 people	 can	 be	 legally	 expropriated	 without	 compensation.	
In	 conclusion,	 it	 is	 not	 simple	 to	 determine	whether	 or	 not	 someone	has	
property	rights	in	Panzi.	The	property	rights	of	Panzi	residents	are	situated	
on	 a	 continuum	 largely	 conditioned	 by	 people’s	 financial	means	 and	 the	
political,	coercive	and	economic	power	of	their	parapluie;	that	is,	their	social	
connections.
	 Political	 theory	 tends	 to	 assume	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 strong	
central	 state,	 anarchy	 prevails.	 Conventionally,	 anarchy	 is	 associated	 with	
a	 spontaneity,	 rage,	 instinctual	behavior,	 corruption,	 and	 the	proliferation	
of	 violence	 and	 crime.	 Yet,	 this	 brief	 suggests	 that	 Bukavu’s	 “property	
anarchy”	 is	 anything	 but	 anarchic	 in	 the	 conventional	 sense	 of	 the	word.	
Rather,	illegality	is	produced	through	the	daily	practices	of	land	governance.	
The	problem	with	 framing	 the	nexus	between	property,	 conflict	 and	 land	
governance	as	anarchic	in	the	conventional	sense	of	the	term	is	that	it	conjures	
up	 a	 dichotomous	 understanding	 of	 legality	 and	 illegality.	 However,	 in	
practice,	the	law	does	not	operate	in	this	way.	Neither	the	law	nor	anarchy,	or	
the	legal	and	the	illegal,	refer	to	objective	universal	states	of	being	or	domains	
of	actions.	Instead,	the	boundary	between	the	two	is	drawn	through	concrete	
political	struggles	(Mitchell	1999).	Thus,	when	such	distinctions	are	evoked,	
we	must	not	take	them	as	boundaries	between	discrete	domains	or	identities	
(the	 legal	 v.	 the	 criminal	 subject),	 but	 as	 attempts	 by	 different	 groups	 or	
individuals	 (more	 or	 less	 coordinated)	 to	 establish,	 maintain,	 or	 disturb	
a	 certain	 political	 order	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	 and	wealth	 that	 it	
protects.	What	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 the	nexus	between	 land	governance,	 conflict,	
and	property	rights	 in	Panzi	 is	who	has	the	right	and	ability	to	define	and	
impose	limits	between	illegality	and	legality,	even	at	the	microlevel	between	
neighbours.	What	counts	as	 legal	 is	not	predominantly	determined	by	the	
law,	but	rather	through	struggles	to	define	or	impose	a	certain	definition	of	
“anarchy-order.”	This	means	that	people’s	property	rights	and	the	outcomes	
of	land	conflicts	are	determined	by	the	total	political,	social,	 legal,	coercive	
and	financial	 resources	 that	 they	 can	muster.	This	 condition	of	 “anarchy-
order”	has	been	dubbed	locally	as	“justice à deux vitesses”	meaning	that	justice	
is	rendered	differently	according	to	who	you	are,	who	you	know,	and	what	
you	are	worth.	Therefore,	 in	order	to	understand	why	most	of	Panzi	plots	
and	buildings	are	illegal—that	is,	do	not	conform	to	the	rules	of	the	law—it	
would	be	misleading	 to	 resort	 to	 stereotypical	notions	of	anarchy.	Rather,	
what	needs	to	be	understood	and	answered	is	how	notions	of	anarchy	and	
order	are	employed	and	in	whose	interest.
Map 3. Panzi neighborhood
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ENDNOTES
1  They	are:	Major	Vangu,	Bizimana,	Mbeke,	Mushununu,	Mulengeza	1,	
and	Mulengeza	2.
2  This	data	was	compiled	at	the	Bureau	of	Panzi	Neighbourhood,	the	
Municipality	of	Ibanda,	the	Mayor’s	Office	in	Bukavu,	and	at	the	Provincial	
Ministry	of	Interior	of	South	Kivu.
3		Interview,	resident,	Panzi,	December	3,	2016.
4		Interview,	chef de quartier,	Panzi,	December	2,	2016.
5 	Interview,	resident,	Panzi,	December	1,	2016.
6 See	also	van	Overbeek	2014.
7		Interview,	employee,	Provincial	Department	of	Housing,	Bukavu,	
August	24,	2016.
8  Interview,	employee,	Provincial	Department	of	Housing,	Bukavu,	
August	24,	2016.
9 	Interview,	resident,	Panzi,	December	1,	2016.
10		Interview,	resident,	Panzi,	December	2,	2016.
11 	Interview,	resident,	Panzi,	December	1,	2016.
12  Interview,	chef	d’avenue,	Panzi,	December	4,	2016.
13 	Interview,	resident,	Panzi,	December	2,	2016.
14 	Interview,	resident,	Panzi,	December	4,	2016.
15		Interview,	resident	Panzi,	December	5,	2016.
16  Interview,	resident,	Panzi,	December	4,2016.
17		Interview,	chef	d’avenue,	Panzi,	6	December	2016.
Photo from Panzi
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